In a bold move, former Attorney General Ed Meese, flanked by law professors Steven G. Calabresi and Gary S. Lawson, has taken center stage in the legal arena, urging the Supreme Court to dismiss Special Counsel Jack Smith’s case against former President Donald Trump. The crux of their argument, as reported by Fox News on Thursday, revolves around what Meese contends is an unconstitutional appointment by Attorney General Merrick Garland.
Meese and his co-authors filed a friend-of-the-court brief on Wednesday, meticulously outlining their stance that Garland’s appointment of Smith, a private citizen, violates the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. Their legal maneuver seeks to persuade the Court that Smith’s standing in the case is akin to a “naked emperor,” lacking the constitutional authority required for such a pivotal role.
The heart of the brief asserts that Smith, in his capacity as a private citizen, lacks the legitimate authority of the federal government. Drawing provocative parallels, the authors liken Smith’s position to that of public figures such as Bryce Harper, Taylor Swift, or Jeff Bezos, emphasizing the absence of a proper governmental mandate for his representation in the Court.
Smith’s role as Special Counsel centers around his plea to expedite proceedings related to criminal charges against Trump, specifically regarding the events of January 6, 2021. Meese argues that the alleged “illegality” of Smith’s appointment should be grounds enough to reject further review of the case, putting a spotlight on what he deems an unauthorized extension of extraordinary criminal law enforcement powers to a private citizen.
The brief underscores that Smith’s investigative authority, granted by Garland, is rooted in purported statutory authority. Meese, however, vehemently contends that none of the cited statutes or any other constitutional provisions empower the Attorney General to confer such sweeping powers upon a private citizen under the title of Special Counsel.
Even if one were to overlook the absence of statutory authority, Meese points out a critical omission — no statute specifically grants the Attorney General, rather than the President with the Senate’s advice and consent, the power to appoint a Special Counsel.
Meese’s argument hinges on challenging both statutory and constitutional authority for Smith’s appointment, stressing the lack of legal grounds for bestowing substantial investigative powers upon a private citizen without explicit authorization.
This legal challenge opens a contentious debate surrounding the extent of appointment authority and the boundaries on granting prosecutorial powers to individuals outside the formal structures of the federal government. As Meese and his co-authors meticulously expose potential constitutional and statutory deficiencies in Smith’s appointment, their legal stance injects complexity into the ongoing discourse on executive authority limits when designating individuals for significant law enforcement roles. The Supreme Court now faces a weighty decision as it navigates the intricate web of constitutional interpretation and executive authority.