Last week witnessed the Supreme Court dismissing Special Counsel Jack Smith’s plea for an expedited review of former President Donald Trump’s appeal, asserting immunity from charges related to the January 6, 2021 Capitol violence. While the immunity issue may return to the Supreme Court post the D.C. Circuit’s assessment, the justices will first evaluate the legitimacy of two of the four charges against Trump. A prevailing sentiment suggests a majority may declare that the offenses charged by the special counsel lack the criteria to be classified as crimes. This analysis delves into the legal intricacies.
Smith lodged a four-count indictment against Trump in a D.C. federal court, aiming to criminally implicate the former president in the events of January 6, 2021. The charges included conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy against rights, conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding, and obstruction of an official proceeding. The Supreme Court is poised to determine if the events of January 6 meet the criteria for criminal obstruction of an official proceeding under Section 1512 of the federal criminal code in the case United States v. Fischer.
The court recently agreed to hear Joseph Fischer’s appeal, probing whether 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) criminalizes acts unrelated to investigations and evidence that obstruct an “official proceeding.” Fischer, akin to Trump, faced charges under § 1512(c) for actions on January 6 obstructing the electoral vote certification. The central issue in Fischer’s case revolves around statutory interpretation, specifically scrutinizing the language of § 1512(c).
Section 1512(c), titled “Witness, Victim, or Informant Tampering,” stipulates that anyone who corruptly alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals an object with the intent to impair its integrity for use in an official proceeding, or otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes an official proceeding, shall face penalties. Fischer and Trump, along with numerous January 6 defendants, were accused of violating subsection 2 of § 1512(c) by “otherwise” obstructing the certification of the electoral vote.
Fischer contended that § 1512(c) only criminalizes conduct rendering evidence unavailable to an “official proceeding,” a position initially supported by the district court but overturned by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari suggests a deeper examination of the statute’s application.
Drawing parallels to a precedent, Begay v. United States, offers insights into potential outcomes. In Begay, the court interpreted a statute with an “otherwise” catchall clause, akin to § 1512(c). The court held that the clause did not encompass all crimes presenting a “serious potential risk of physical injury,” emphasizing the importance of interpreting statutes to give effect to every clause and word.
Applying the reasoning in Begay to the Fischer case suggests that § 1512(c) may only criminalize conduct similar to that covered by subsection 1, which pertains to impairing evidence for an official proceeding. Fischer’s indictment, however, lacks an allegation of impairing evidence, potentially leading to a dismissal if the Supreme Court aligns with Begay’s interpretation.
As the Supreme Court deliberates the Fischer appeal this term, the prospect arises for Special Counsel Smith to pause Trump’s criminal trial, awaiting the court’s ruling. However, concerns loom over the perceived haste by both the special counsel and the district court, driven by a desire for a conviction before the 2024 election. The unfolding Fischer case may challenge the viability of sought-after convictions and underscores a disconcerting lack of public concern.
